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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff' ({lid llei;pondcnt, 
vs. 
DONALD JOE THORXTOX, 
Dcfe11dant ((l/d A]Jpcllant. 
Case No. 
11320 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Donald Joe Thornton, appeals from 
a conviction of rape in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
~ 76-.53-15 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
Appellant was tried for and found guilty of the 
crime of rape by a jury verdict on February 29, 1968. 
The trial was conducted before the Honorable Charles 
1 
G. Cowley in the Second J uclicial District Court. Sen-
tence was imposed on April 15, 19G8, committing the 
appellant to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminaut 
sentence as provided by law of from not less than ten 
years to life imprisonment. 
RELIEF SOlJGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the jury verdict should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 17, 1907, appellant Donald Joe 
Thornton, forcibly raped Mrs. Beverly \·Vinquist near 
the garage at her place of residence (Tr. 5-9). The 
appellant was arrested on N (Wember 27, 1967 at approxi· 
mately 4 :30 p.m. on the charge of the crime of rape by 
Police Detective Raymond R. Donnally of the Ogden 
City Police Department (Tr. 64). Detective Donnally 
advised and explained to appellant his constitutional 
rights after appellant was in the police car (Tr. u4-66), 
and he was then taken to the Ogden City Police Station 
for questioning. At the police station the appellant was 
questioned by Sergeant Larry Dean Scott, this ques· 
1 
tioning beginning at approximately 5 p.m. (Tr. 76). 1 
Before Sergeant Scott began his questioning, he not 
only advised Mr. Thornton of his constitutional rights 
but thoroughly explained to the appellant each of his 
rights (Tr. 76-79:113), stopping frequently to deter· 
2 
mine if the appellant understood these rights (Tr. 76-
79). After Mr. Thornton had intelligently and know-
ingly waived his constitutional rights, appellant was 
questioned concerning the alleged rape. He voluntarily 
confessed to committing the crime as charged (Tr. 119). 
This confession was reduced to writing and signed 
by appellant. A preliminary hearing was held Decem-
ber 8, 1907, and at its conclusion the appellant was 
bound over to the District Court for trial. On December 
18, 1967, the appellant was committed to the Utah State 
Hospital for observation. The psychiatrists' report 
(R.G) concluded that appellant was legally sane to 
stand trial and aid in his own defense and knew the na-
ture of the act of which he was accused. 
Trial was held before a jury in the Second Judicial 
Di,,trict Court with a verdict of guilty being returned 
by the jury. On April 15, 1968, sentence was imposed 
upon the appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT MADE A KNU\VING, IN-
TELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY 'VAIVER 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
HIS CONFESSION GIVEN VOLUNTARILY 
WAS ADMISSABLE INTO EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends that he did not make an intelli-
gent, knowing or voluntary waiver of his constitutional 
3 
rights under the stan<lar<ls of Miranda v. Arizona, 38± 
U.S. 436 ( 1966). The state contends, however, that the 
record clearly shows that appellant was advised of his 
constitutional rights, and the meaning and impact of 
these rights were carefully explamed to him (Tr. 65, 
113). The interrogating officer, Sergeant Scott, testi-
fied that he carefully explained each of the 1Uirand11 
warnings to appellant. In relating what he said to ap· 
pellant, the sergeant testified as follows: 
THE \V ITN ESS: l said to him that he was 
a suspect in some crimes that happened in Ogden 
Citv an<l that I wanted to advise him of his 
rigi1ts as 1 knew them. I told him then at that 
time that he ha<l a right to remain silent. At 
that time I said: "Now, this means that you don't 
have to talk to me in any way whatsoever. H 
1 
you han' nothing to say all you have to do is 
indieate that you don't want to talk to me and 
I will not talk to vmi anv farther." And he sai<l 
"no", that I sho~hl talk to him. He was then 
told that "Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a eourt of law." I explained 1 
to him that this meant that if he did admit com-
mitting any crimes in Ogden City or anywhere ' 
else that these wo11l<l be taken before the judge 
and he would possibly be charged with these 
crimes as a defeH<lant. Ile asked me who could 
be against him. I told him this meant that it ' 
could be used hi eourt to show that he had ad-
mitted to the crime which was in question. 
Q. (By ~Ir. J wld) \\Th;1t did he then say? 
A. \V ell, he said "I understand it. Go ahead." 
So I told him: "\Yell, I ha Ye some more to ex-
4 
plaiu to ,vou. Then I told him "You have the 
right to talk to a lawyer and have him present 
with you while you are being questioned." I said 
"This meaus that if you want to talk with au 
attorney before you talk with me or while you 
are talking to me, we shall get you an attorney 
if you so desire, and if you want to hire an at-
torney or if you want to call one, you may do 
so." And I indicated the telephone to him if he 
would like to call one. 
C-i. 'Vas there a telephone on the desk at that 
time? 
A. Yes, there was, and a telephone book. 
Q. 'Vas there a working telephone there? 
A. Yes. And at that time I i11dicated to him: 
"If you don't want to call a lawyer and wish me 
to do so, I will call one for you." 
Sergeant Scott's testimony continued: 
THE 'VITNESS: He was told that if he 
didn't want to call an attorney I would call one 
for him. And he said: "No, I don't need an at-
torney." And he was then advised that if he 
didn't haw the money to hire an attorney we 
would see thta one was appointed for him and 
he would haYe one. He was then told that if he 
understood it and everything that I had told 
him, and he said "Yes," that he understood every-
thing that I had explained to him. I asked him 
if now that he understood everything that I had 
told him if he wished to talk to me, and he said 
"Yes," that he would talk to me. 
MR. JUDD: And after that did you have a 
conversation with him? 
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THE \VITNESS: Yes, sir, I did. (Tr. n 
79). 
This testimony clearly reflects that every safeguard 
was taken by the police to insure that appellant was 
aware of his constitutional rights and that he understood 
the scope of these rights. 111 response to these carefulll' 
explained warnings, the appellant stated that he unde;. 
stood them and waived them. There is no showing that 
the police coerced or induced the confession from the 
appellant. Instead the atmosphere was one wherein 1 
every effort was made to guarantee that appellant's con· 
stitutional rights were protected. The waiver by appel-
lant of his rights was knowingly, intelligently and volun· 
tarily made. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S LO\V INTELLIGENCE 
DID NOT PRE CL UDE Hil\I FROM MAKI.KG 
A VOLUNTARY, KNO\VING AND INTELLI· 
GENT W AIYER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Appellant contends that due to his low intelligence, 
his inability to read, and his general lack of common 
knowledge, he is not capable of making a knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional 
rights. 'V"hile the state sees merit in the argument that 
a person of low intelligence may not be able to compre· 
hend quickly the full meaning of his constitutional 
rights, the fact that a person is of low mentality does 
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not preclude him from being able to understand these 
rights and voluntarily waive them. A person's intelli-
gence is but one factor to be considered in determinin'• ,.,, 
the rnlition of a confession. 
People v. Lara, 62 Cal. Rept. 586, 432 P.2d 202 
( 1967) states: 
To sum up, we have seen that a minor, even 
of subnormal mentality, does not lack the capa-
city as a matter of law to make a voluntary con-
fessi011 without the presence or consent of coun-
sel or other responsible adult, or to make a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel 
at trial, in either event, the issue is one of fact 
to be decided on the "totality of the circum-
stances" of each case. 
The California Court stated in People v. Tipton, 
J8 Cal.2d 389, at 394, 309 P.2d 913 (1957) that: 
B-owever, a confession is not rendered inad-
missible by a . . . low emotional and mental 
stability on the part of the suspect if he is never-
theless capable of unders~anding the meaning 
end effect of his confession. People v. Isby, 30 
Cal.2d 879, 897-898, 186 P.2d 405 (1947). 
In State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 
(1956), aff'd 357 U.S. 426 ( 1958), the Utah Court said: 
Certainly the intelligence, character, and situ-
ation of the accused at the time of the under-
standing is an important consideration. Mani-
festly, the will of a person who is of tender age 
or of weak intellect may be more mature or more 
incelligent. This, alone~ however, will not render 
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a confession inadmissable and if the confession 
was obtained in a manner and by such method1 
as are consistent with the proper detection of 
crime and determination of guilt then our duty 
is to sustain the trial court. Citing, State ~. 
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948). 
In the present case the evaluation of the appellant 
at the Utah State Hospital by Dr. Roger S. Kiger au<l 
Dr. Gordon P. Johnson (R.6) lead to Lhe determination 
that the appellant had an l.Q. of 68. However, the con-
clusion also stated that there were indications of au 
overall I.Q. potential of 80, which implies that the 
appellant has more innate intelligence than the tests 
result indicates. Later in the letter, the doctors con-
clude that, "It is our further opinion that 1\fr. Thornton : 
is responsible for the act for which charged in that he 
knows the nature, quality and wrongfulness thereof: 
and that he was not suffering from an irresistable urge, 
R.6). 
The evaluation and conclusions contained in this i 
report sent to the trial judge certainly indicate that , 
appellant had the ability and intelligence to comprehml ! 
both the nature of the charge against him and his con-
stitutional rights, of which he was adequately advised. ; 
Also, the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the 1 
confession were consistent with lawful police detection i 
of crime and determination of guilt. 
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POINT III 
THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DETERMINATION 
THAT THE CONFESSION \VAS VOLUN-
TARY. 
In Utah, the trial judge must determine whether 
or not a confession has been voluntarily obtained before 
it may be admitted into evidence before a jury. 'fhe 
jury then must determine the weight and credibility to 
be given the confession. The rule, well stated in Justice 
Wade's concurring opinion in State v. Crank, 101 Utah 
592, 126 P.2d 1047 ( 1943) is that: 
... a confession isn't admissable in evidence 
unless voluntarily made; that this question must 
be determined by the court from all of the evi-
dence from both sides bearing thereon; that if 
the court is satisfied from the evidence that the 
confession was voluntary then the court admits 
the confession iu evidence to the jury, together 
with all of the evidence on the question of 
whether it was voluntary, and the circumstances 
surrounding its being made, and from such evi-
dence the jury must determine the weight and 
credibility to be giYeu it, but may not determine 
its competency as evidence that being a question 
for the court. 
In the present case, the trial judge determined 
absent the jury that based upon all the evidence and 
events leading thereto, the confession was voluntarily 
obtained. The record clearly shows why the judge made 
this determination. The letter from the Doctors at the 
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Utah State Hospital states that appellant was capable 
of understanding the nature of the act of which he was 
charged ( R.ti) . The testimony of the arresting officer 
indicates that appellant was immediately advised of hi, 
constitutional rights under the standards established b1 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra (Tr. 64). The testimony ~f 
the interrogating officer indicates that before any ques· 
tioning began the appellant was again advised of hi1 
constitutional rights, and their meaning was carefullr 
explained to him (Tr. 76-78). The record shows that 1 
after these rights were thoroughly explained to appelL111i 
he voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly waived tlmt 
rights (Tr. 79) . 
Based upon this testimony as to the waiver of cou- , 
stitutional rights and voluntary confession, the trial : 
judge determined that the appellant's confession could · 
be admitted into evidence. He left it with the jury as to 
what weight, if any, this testimony should receive. 
CONCLUSION 
The state submits that the record clearly reveals a : 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of appellants 
1 
constitutional rights. Great effort was made to inform 
the appellant of these rights, their impact, extent and 
meaning. Appellant waived these rights and at this 
time should not be allowed to reh1rn to society simph 
upon the argument that he is not intelligent enough to 
10 
understand them. The judgment of the trial court 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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